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[L. A. No. 19393. In Bank. Dec. 17, 1946.]

Estate of GEORGE E. LORING, Deceased.
SARAH M. LORING et aI., as Trustees, Petitioners and Respondents, v. TOWN OF KINGSLEY, Appellant;
BRAILLE INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, INC., et &1.,
Contestants and Respondents.
SA.RAH M. LORING et aI., Appellants, v. TOWN OF
KINGSLEY et aI., Respondents.
BRAILLE INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, INC., Appellants,
v. TOWN OF KINGSLEY et a1., Respondents.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Final Distribution-Decree-Ooncluaiveness.-A decree of distribution that has become ftnal is a conclusive determination of the terms and validity of a testamentary trust and of the rights of all parties thereunder.
[2] IeL-Final Distribution-Decree-PersoDS Ooncluded.-A beneAciary of a testamentary trust is bound by the decree of distribution, although he was not a party to the distribution proceedings and did not avail himself of the opportunity given by
Prob. Code, t 1020, to appear therein.
[1] See llB Oal..Tur. 787; 21 Am..Tur. 6M.
licK. Dig. References: [1,10] Decedents' Estates, § 1053; [2,4, 6]
Decedents' Estates, § 1055; [8] Decedents' Estates, § 22; [5] Trusts,
§ 176; [7,8,11) Decedents' Estates, § 1058; [9) Decedents' Estates,
§ 37; [12] Wills, § 428; [13] Charities, t 17; [14] Charities, 141;
[15,17,18] Charities, § 36; [16] Charities, 137.
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[8] Id. - Administration Proceedings - Notice.-A posted notice
of distribution proceedings given pursuant to Prob. Code,
§ 1200, is sufficient to bind a beneficiary, although he could also
request, if he wished to do so. that he be given special written
Doticf' of the proceedings.
[4] Id. - Final Distribution - Decree - Persons Ooncluded. - An
assignee of an heir, devisee or legatee is bound by the decree
of distribution in so far as it determines the rights that his
assignor would have in the estate had no assignment been made.
[6] Trusts - Interest of Beneficia17.-As distinguished from the
beneficiary of a testamentary trust, the interest of the beneficiary of a constructive trust does not arise under the will or
the laws of intestate succession.
(6] Decedents' Estates - Final Distribution - Decree - Persons
Ooncluded.-A beneficiary of a testamentary trust is an heir,
legatee or devisee within the meaning of Prob. Code, § 1021,
relating to a decree of distribution.
[7] Id.-Final Distribution-Decree-lI4atters Determined-Trusts.
- I f the trust provisions of a will were either valid or entirely
void, a deeree distributing the trust estate to the trustee would,
once final. conclusively establish the validity of the trust.
[8] Id.-Final Distribution-Decree-Matters Determined-Trusts.
-If a testamentary trust were of 811ch a nature "hat in case
of its partial invalidity the trust estate would be reduced and
the property involved wonld go to others than the trustee, a
distribution of the whole to the trustee would be conclusive.
[9] Id.-Administration Proceedings-Trusts.,--Where the probate
court has jurisdiction to pass on the validity of the residuary
provisions of a testamentary trust, it has jurisdiction to pass
on the validity of other provisions of the trust.
[10] Id.-Final Distribution-Decree-Oonclusiveness.-Once final,
an erroneous decree of distribution, like any other erroneous judgment. is as t'ondusive as a decree that contains no
error.
[11] ld.-Final Distribution-Decree-lI4atters Concluded-Trusts.
-Under Prob. Code, § 1120, the probate court's equity jurisdiction to determine to whom the property shall pass on termination of a testamentary trust is limited, and the court cannot
make that determination by reopening issues that were conclusively passed on in the distribut.ion proceedings.
[12] Wills - Satisfaction of Gifts - Priorities and Abatement.Prob. Code, § 752. relating to preference in payment of legacies
to kindred of testator over other legacies has no application
[10] See lIB Oal.Jor. 787, 796.
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to • depreciation in value of trust assets after those asaets have
been distributed to trustees. In such a case the decree of final
distribution alone is the measure of the rights of the bendaiaries of the trust and, in the absence of any provision therein
as to any preference among benefieiaries, they must share the
1088 ratably.
[13] Oharities-Giftll-Intent.-The fact that, in making a gift to
establish an institution that is otherwise charitable, the donor
provides that thc institution shall be named for him or some
other person does not indicate • lack of oharitable intent.
Such a requirement is regarded as part of the scheme of administration rather than the inducement for the gift.
[14] Id.-Evidence-Su1!icienClJ.-ln a proceeding involving rights
of beneficiaries under a testamentary trust, the evidence of the
testator's purpose in making a gift to a town to establish •
hospital supported the conclnsion that he had • eharitablo intent where it appeared that he had been reared in the town
and had made most of his fortune there.
[16] Id.-Administration and Oontrol-The fact that . . puticmIar purpose. to which the funds of • testamentar, trait a:re to
be applied caunot be carried out becanse there are I. . funds
.vailable than he had contemplated does not necessarily defeat
the gift. It is su1Bcient if that purpose can be substantially
earned out.
[16] Id.-Admmistration and Control-C7 Pres Doc:trine.-If thl'
ey pre, doctrine is limited to the rule that a court of equity
will carry out the general charitable intention of the donor
when his specific purpose becomes impossible or impractical
of fulflllment, a provision in a trust for a gift over in the event
of the failure of the particular charitable purpose prevents the
application of that doctrine.
[17] Id.-Administra.tion and OontroL-A speci1lc charitable purpose of the donor does not become impossible or impractical of
fulft1lment simply beeause it cannot be earried out in the exact
terms of the gift.
[18] Id. - Administr&tion and Control - Where • testamentary
trust provided that certain funds be given to a town to establish a hospital and the court, in a proceeding involving the
rights of beneficiaries under the trust, ordered that • lesser
amount, based on the one-third limitation applicable to oharitable gifts, be made available to the town for this purpose, it
was a reasonable modi1lcation of the trust to enforce the gift
for a smaller hospital rather than to allow the testator's intention to provide • hospital in the town to fail entirely•
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County directing trustees with reference to distribution of a trust estate. Thomas C. Gould, Judge. Modi1led and
affirmed.
Newlin " Ashburn and Paul Sandmeyer for Appellant
Town of Kingsley, Iowa.
O'Me1veny " Myers, Louis W. Myers, Fred H. Schmidt
and Pierce Works for Appellants Samh M. Loring et at
Tanner, Odell " Taft and Robert A. Odell for Appellant
.Braille Institute of America, Inc.
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TRAYNOR, J.-George E. Loring died testate leaving the
residue of his estate to trustees whom he directed to pay
within five years of his death bequests aggregating $111,000.
Of that amount the Town of Kingsley, Iowa, was to receive
$75,000 for the construction and maintenance of a hospital;
Braille Institute of America, Inc., was to receive $10,000; and
the balance with the exception of a bequest of $5,000 to a
stranger to his blood, was to go to nine nieces, nephews and
grandnephews of the testator. Within the same period of time
his sister was to receive the remainder of the trust estate and
the trust was thereupon to tenninate. The foregoing dispositions were incorporated in the decree of final distribution
under whieh the trustees received assets valued at more than
$150,000, and that decree became final. Less than three years
thereafter and before any payment had been made by the
trustees, the value of the trust estate had shrunk to approxi-}
mately $55,000. The trustees therefore petitioned the probate court for instructions as to the distribution of that amount :'~
among the beneficiaries of the trust. Separate answers were .~
filed by the Town of Kingsley, the Braille Institute and a ·1
group of beneficiaries comprising testator's sister, one of his ~
nieces and his two grandnephews. The latter group will here- ~It:
inafter be referred to as the Lorings. The court held that the
provisions of section 41 of the Probate Code restricting gifts ,~.
to charities to one-third of the testator's estate were applicable
to the bequests to the Town of Kingsley and the Braille Institute and accordingly instructed the trustees to distribute to
them one-third of the aggregate of the amount now avaDable
for disribution plus approximately $11,000 previously dis-
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tributed during probate plus any refund of federal estate tax.
Of the amount so distributable to them the Town of Kingsley
was to receive 15/17 and the Braille Institute 2/17. The
court further directed that the individual beneficiaries be paid
in full and that the residue be delivered to testator's sister.
The Town of Kingsley and the Braille Institute appeal from
the order in so far as it limits them to one-third of the estate.
The Lorings appeal from the order in so far as it directs that
any part of the trust estate be diRtn"buted to the Town of
Kingsley.
The Lorings contend not only that the testator could not
leave more than one-third of his estate to charities, but that
he could not leave any property in this state to a municipal
corporation of another state: that the decree of distribution
determined neither of these issues; and that in any ease the
kindred of the testator should be paid in full before any payment is made either to the town or to the institute, for section
752 of the Probate Code requires legacies to nonkindred to
abate before legacies to kindred abate. The town contends
that the decree of distribution is res judicata as to its right to
take at all under the will of a California testator, as to its
right and that of the inRtitute to talte more than one-third of
his estate, and as to their right to share proportionately with
the other beneficiaries in the available funds, and that in any
event the will of the testator expressed the intention that no
preference be given to any beneficiary of the trust. The institute joins in these eontentions.
[1] It is settled, and the Lorings concede, that a decree
of distribution that has become final is a conclusive determination of the terms and validity of a testamentary trust alid
of the rights of aU parties thereunder. (Estate of Easter, 24
Cal.2d 191, 194 {148 P.2d 601]; Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal.2d 639.
652 [111 P.2d 322]: McLellan v. McLellan, 17 Cal.2d552.
553 [110 P.2d 1034] ; Manning v. Bank of California, 216 Cal.
629, 634 [15 P.2d 746] ; Whittingh.am v. California Trust Co.,
214 Cal. 128, 132 [4 P.2d 142]; L1ucomb v. Fintzelberg, 162
Cal. 433, 438 r123 P. 247]; Keating v. Smith, 154 Cal. 186.
191 [97 P. 300]; Matter of Trust of Trescon!l, 119 Cal. 568,
570 [51 P. 951]; Goad v. Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552, 557-8
[51 P. 681, 63 Am..St.Rep. 145]; Goldtree v. Allison, 119 Cal.
344, 345 [51 P. 561]; Crew v. Pratt, 119 Cal. 139, 151 [51 P.
38] ; Estate 0/ Lingg, 71 Cal.App.2d 403, 409 [162 P.2d 707];
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Estate 01 White, 69 Cal.App.2d 749, 755 [160 P.2d 204]; Society of Cal. Pioneers v. It[cElroy, 63 Cal.App.2d 332, 340
[146 P.2d 962]; McGavin v. San 'Francisco P. O. A. Sec., 34
Cal.App. 168, 173 {167 P. 182].} The Lorings contend, however, that that determination does not conclude the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust, for the beneficiaries of such a
trust are not parties to the distribution proceedings and in
fact have no rights as beneficiaries until the trust is ereated
by distribution of the trust assets to the testamentary trustee.
They concede that under section 1020 of the Probate Code
they could have appeared in the distribution proceedings as
persons "interested in the estate," but contend that they were
not required to do 80 and that they lost none of their rights
for not appearing therein. To bolster their contention that
they were not parties to those proceedings they further eontend that they could neither have petitioned for distribution
nor sued the executors after distribution for their share of the
estate. They point out finally that section 1021 of the Probate Code provides that the decree shall be conclusive only as
to the rights of "heirs, devisees and legatees."
[2] The administration of a decedent's estate involves a
series of separate proceedings, each of which is intended to be
1inal (Estate of Davis, 151 Cal. 318, 323 [86 P. 183, 90 P. 711,
121 Am.St.Rep. 105]), not only as to the parties who appear
therein. but also as to all persons "interested in the estate"
whose rights may be affected, although they did not appear
therein. In fact, it is undoubtedly because all such personR
were to be bound by various orders and decrees entered in
the eourse of the administration of the estate, that the Legislature expressly provided that they might appear and protect
their rights in the proceedings that lead to such orders and
decrees. (See Prob. Code. §§ 361,370,407,442,522,584,681,
756, 810, 831, 841, 860, 921, 922, 927, 1000, 1010, 1020, 1200.)
Thus, section 1020 of the Probate Code does more than merely
give, as the Lorings contend, a beneficiary an opportunity to
litigate before the final distribution of the estate, the question
as to hi!'! rights under the trust that he would otherwise litigate
at some later date and that he remains entitled to litigate at
such later date. It assumes that these rights will necessarily
be adjudicated in the distribution proceedings and it is for
that reason and because a beneficiary would otherwise have no
opportunity to be heard, that he is given the opportunity to
appear in those proeeedings.
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[3] Section 1020 of the Probate Code requires that the
estate be distributed only after notice has been given as provided in section 1200 of that code. The Lorings point out
that under the latter section and section 1202 of the Probate
Code they could have asked that special notice of the distribution proceedings be given them and contend that they are not
bound by those proceedings, !'Iince they did not choose to ask
for such notice. Section 1200 provides, however, in addition
to the special written notice that any person interested in the
estate may request, for a posted notice to "all persons interested to appear _ . . and show cause . • • why the order
should not be made." Section 1200 further provides that, if
the court finds in its order that notice has been regularly given,
that order, "when it becomes final. shall be conclusive upon
all persons." A posted notiee is therefore sufficient to bind
a beneficiary and it appeaJ'R that it is because the Legislature
contemplated that he would be bound by neb notice that
provision was also made as a protection against posslDle unfaime.c:;s for him to request, if he wi!lhed to do 80, that he be
given special written notice of the proceedings.
The Lorings contend that a decree of distribution is conclusive only as to the rights of heirs, devisees and legatees;
that a beneficiary under a te.'ltamentary trust belongs to none
of these classes; and that he should no more be bound by the
decree than the creditor or assignee of an heir or legatee or
the beneficiary of a constructive or resulting trust. In this
connection the Lorings rely upon a series of eases in which
thi!l court stated that, although a decree of distribution is
conclusive as to the right.~ of heirs. devisees and legatees, "it
is conclusive against them only as heirs, legatees, or devisees,
-only so far as they claim in such capacities." (Ohe1)6r v.
Ching Hong Poy, 82 Cal 68, 71 [22 P. 1081]; see, also, Kingsbury v. Ross, 217 Cal. 484.486 [19 P.2d 7841; Parr v. Reyman,
215 Ca1. 616. 619 [12 P.2d 440]: Oooley v. Miller ct Lu:e, 156
Cal. 510, 515 (105 P. 981J.) These eases all involved a situation in which an heir, devisee or legatee conveyed his share in
the estate before the decree of distribution. They hold that
that decree is not conclusive as between such heir, devisee or
legatee and his assignee and with respect to the rights arising
under the assignment, even though the assignee is also an heir,
devisee or legatee of the decedent. [4] It is settled, however, that the assignee is bound by the decree in 80 far as it
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determines the rights that his assignor would have in the estate
had no assignment been made. (William. H'ilZ 00. v. Lawler,
116 Cal. 359, 362 [48 P. 323].) In Martinovich v. Marsicano,
137 Cal. 354 [70 P. 459], upon which the Lorings also rely,
a judgment creditor of a devisee secured a lien upon that
devisee's share of the estate before the decree of distribution.
This court held that the subsequent distnoution of that share
to the devisee did not discharg the creditor's lien. It was
pointed out that "the expression in some of ••• [the] eases
to the effect that under the notice for distribution the whole
world is brought before the court, and that every person entitled to assert a claim against the estate must present the
same or lose his right thereto, is to be construed in connection
with the authority of the court over the subject-matter before
it. The court has jurisdiction to distribute only the estate of
which the decedent was possessed at the time of his death, and
it is only a claim against that estate, or for some portion of it,
for which it can make provision in its decree. .As it can exercise this jurisdiction over only the persons to whom the estate
is to be distributed, it is only these persons who can be aifeeted
by the notice or required to give it any attention." .(137 Cal.
at p. 359.) Thus, none of these cases support the Lorings'
position, but merely emphasize that, as this court said in In r'
Burdick, 112 Cal. 387, 393 [44 P. 734], "the decree of distribution is conclusive on ly as to the succession or testamentary
rights."
[6] There is a clear distinction between the position of
the beneficiary of a testamentary trust and the position of the
beneficiary of a constructive trust under an agreement between
a testator and his devisee that the latter will hold the property
devised as trustee. The interest of the beneficiary of a constructive trust does not arise under the will or the laws of
intestate succession. (8ear, v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d 131, 139 [163
P.2d 443] and eases there cited.)
[6] If the Lorings' contention that a beneficiary under
a testamentary trust is neither an heir, nor a legatee, nor a
devisee within the meaning of section 1021 of the Probate Code
is now reexamined in the light of the eases holding that, although persons without the scope of testamentary or intestate
succession are not bound by the decree, persons within that I
scope are bound thereby, the conclusion is inevitable that such
beneficiary must be regarded as a legatee or devisee under that :
aeetion. The Lorings point out that elsewhere in the Probate I
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Code reference is made both to heirs, devisees, legatees and
to beneficiaries under a trust (e. g., § 1202). Whatever be the
meaning of the words "heirs, devisees and legatees" in other
parts of the code, however, they were intended in section 1021
to cover beneficiaries under a testamentary trust as well as
all other persons who may have aequired rights to the property of a decedent under his will or under the rules of intestate succession. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact
that the beneficiary of a testamentary trust may petition for
distribution of the estate to the testamentary trustee (Estate
of Baldwin, 21 Cal.M 586, 592 [134 P.2d 259]; Eltafe of
MafTe, 18 Oal.2d 184, 190 [114 P.2d 586]; 'Estate of Friedman,
171 Oal. 431, 441 [153 P. 918]; In re Mackay, 107 Cal. 303, 307
[40 P. 558] ; Esfate of McGirl, 125 Oal.App. 310. 813 [13 P.2d
746]), although section 1020 of the Probate Oode only provides
that such petition can be flIed by "the executor or administrator, or ••• any heir, devisee or legatee, or his· assignee,
grantee or successor in interest. . . ."
[7] The Lorings fnrther contend that, although the decree
of distribution is conclu.odve as to the rights of the beneficiaries
of a testamentary trust, it is conclusive only as to those rights
that were necessarily in issue in the distribution proceedings,
and that none of the rights now being asserted are such 8.R
were or must be deemed to have been in issue therein. They
concede, as they must, that if the trust provisions of the wiD
were either entirely valid or entirely void, the decree distributing the trust estate to the trustee would, once final, conclusively
establish the validity of the trust, for thereean be no distribution to the trustee unless the trust is valid. [8] Similarly,
if the trust were of such a nature that in ease of its partia1
invalidity the trust estate would be reduced and the property
involved would go to others than the trustee, a distrIbution
of the whole to the trustee would be conclusive. [9] The
Lorings contend, however, that in the present ease the provisions of the trust were such that the entire trust estate would
have been distributed to the trustees, regardless of the invalidity of the bequests to the town and the institute, 80 that there
was no need for the probate court to pass upon their validity
in the distribution proceedings. It is true that a detennination
by the probate court of the partial or total invalidity of the
charitable provisions of the trust would simp1y have increased
the share of the residuary beneficiary. It would have increased

432

ESTATE 011' LoRING

[29 C.2d

it, however, only on the assumption that the provisions in
favor of the residuary beneficiary were themselves valid. Although the provisions in favor of decedent's sister appear to
be valid, the fact remains that it was necessary for the probate
court to pass upon their validity before it could decide that
the other provisions of the trust need not be passed upon. The
logic of the Lorings' pOSition would thus lead us to make a
distinction between eases in which the testamentary trust
contains no residuary clause and in which the decree of distribution is therefore conclusive as to the validity of all the
provisions of the trust and cases in which the trust· contains
a residuary clause and the decree is conclusive only as to the
validity of that clause. Moreover, the question is not whether
it was proper for the probate court to pass upon the validity
of all the provisions of the trust, but whether, assuming that
it did, its determination is conclusive. Since the court had
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of at least the residuary
provisions of the trust, it clearly had jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the other provisions thereof. Although
the Lorings contend that it did not pass upon the validity of
the other provisions the wording of the decree compels the
conclusion that it did. It may well be that in doing 80 it
failed to consider the provisions of the Probate Code restricting charitable bequests to one-third of the estate and erroneously held all the provisions of the trust to be valid. [10] It
is settled, however, that, once final, an erroneous decree of distribution, like any other erroneous judgment, is as conclusive
as a decree that contains no error. (Estate of Goldberg, 10
Ca1.2d 709, 713 [76 P.2d 508]; Manning v. Bank of California,
supra, 216 Cal. 629, 634; Luscomb v. Fintzelberg, supra, 162
Cal. 433, 438; Keating v. Smith, suprG, 154 Cal. 186, 191;
McGavin v. San Francisco P. O. A. Soc., suprG, 34 Cal.App.
168, 173; see llB Cal.Jur., Executors and Administrators,
§ 1296.)
The Lorings rely upon Estate of Campbell, 175 Cal. 345
[165 P. 931]. In that ease this court reversed a decree of
partial distribution that gave the heir at law of the testator
two-thirds of her estate on the ground that her will was invalid to that extent. The will provided for a trust for the life
of a certain beneficiary with remainder to charities under certain contingencies. This court held first that, since the charitable provisions were not part of the trust, the heir at law
eould in no ease receive two-thirds of the estate free of that

..
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trust, and second that, the eontingencies upon whieh the gift
to eharities depended were of such a nature that it could not
be detennined at that time whether that gift exceeded onethird of the estate. It was held accordingly that "the only
way in which the rights of all parties can be fully protected
is at this time to distribute all the property to the trustee for
the purposes of the trust, reserving the matter of further
distribution until the termination of the trust, at least in 80 far
as the charitable bequest is concerned." (175 Cal. at p. 352.)
It may be that further distribution should have been similarly
reserved in the present ease. It was not, however, nor was any
appeal taken from the decree providing that the Town of
Kingsley was to receive $75,000 and the Braille Institute
$10,000.
[11] The Lorings contend that the issues in the present
ease arose after the dooree and because of a ehange in circumstances unforeseen at the time it was rendered; that these
issues are cognizable in equity only; and that the probate
court has no equity jurisdiction, save the limited jurisdiction
that it can exercise after distribution under the provisions of
section 1120 of the Probate Code. They further contend that
it is that limited jurisdiction that the court should now exercise and that to hold that the decree of distnoution is res
judicata as to the issues in the present ease would render
section 1120 meaningless, for it would give the court no jurisdiction except to "rubber-stamp" the decree of distribution.
It must be conceded that circumstances now are different from
those at the time of the decree and that the probate court ha~
jurisdiction to detennine in the light of the changed circumstances how to divide the trust estate among the beneficiaries.
It cannot make that detennination, however, by reopening
issues that were conclusively passed upon in the distribution
proCeedings. Section 1120 itself contemplates that the exereise of the court's equity jurisdiction is 80 limited, for it provides that the court may detennine to whom the property
shall pa&'l upon the tennination of the trust, "to the extent
that such detennination is not concluded by the decree of
distribution. "
[U] It is further contended that since the assets of the
trust estate are insnfticient to pay all the beneficiaries of the
trust in full, preference in such payment must be given to
the kindred of the testator under Probate Code section 752.
The Lorings rely on B.tate of W..,,,. (12 CalApp.2d 237, 243

.
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[55 P.2d 279]) wherein it was held that under this section,
in the absence of a different intent expressed in the will, legacies to kindred of the testator are to be given preference over
other legacies of the same class where the property at the time
of the decree of distribution is insufficient to pay all such
legacies in full. Section 752, however, has no application to a
depreciation in the value of trust assets after those assets have
been distributed to the trustees. Its place in the Probate Code
indicates that it applies only to proceedings in the course of
the administration of the estate. Although testamentary trusts
arc, for purposes of convenience, placed under the supervision
of the probate courts (Prob. Code, § 1120), the substantive
law governing such trusts after the final decree of distribution
is the law of trusts and not the law of wills. This law, as
respects this case, is no different from that applicable to an
inter vivo. trust. Clearly section 752 would not determine the
shares of beneficiaries in the event of depreciation of the
. corpus of an inter vitlo. trust. The decree of final distribution alone is now the measure of the rights of the beneficiaries
of the trust and, in the absence of any provision therein as to
any preference among beneficiaries, they must share the loss
ratably.
[13] Aside from the question of the finality of the decree
of distribution, it is contended that the gift to the town was
intended primarily to establish a memorial to the testator and
that since only a smaller sum is now available for building,
furnishing, and maintaining the hospital, it would be an erroneous application of the cy pres doctrine to uphold the gift
to the town. This contention is based on the fact that the
decree of distribution, in the terms of the will, provides that
the hospital will be known as the "George E. Loring Hospital." It is contended that, because a memorial as elaborate
as that anticipated by the testator cannot be constructed, the
gift must fail. The fact that, in making a gift to establish
an institution that is otherwise charitable, the donor provides
that the institution shall be named for him or some other party
does not indicate a lack of charitable intent. (Parsons v.
Cht1ds, 345 Mo. 689, 698 [136 S.W. 327]; Noel v. Olds, 138
F.2d 581, 585, and cases there collected.) Such a requirement
is regarded as part of the scheme of administration rather
than the inducement for the gift. (Village of Hin.saale v.
Chicago Cit1l Missionar21 Societ2l, 375 Ill. 220, 234 [30 N.E.2d
657].)
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[14] It is ordinarily unnecessary to go behind the decree
of distribution to determine the charitable intention of the
testator. (See Society of Cal. Pion.eer. v. McEZroy, 63 Cal.
A.pp.2d 332, 338 [146 P.2d 962].) Even if the decree of distribution is considered equivocal in this respect, the evidence of
the testator's purpose in providing for the hospital supports
the conclusion that he had a charitable intent. The evidence
shows that the testator had been reared in the Town of Kingsley and made most of his fortune there. It does not follow
that because he wanted the hospital named after him he was
not concerned with the welfare of the inhabitants of the town.
In any event, in view of the general rule that in case of doubt
a gift must be interpreted in favor of a charity (Conier v.
LfndZey, 203 Cal. 641, 654 [266 P. 526]; O'Hara v. Grand
Lodge, 1. O. G. '1'., 213 Cal. 131, 141 [2 P.2d 21]; Zollman,
American Law of Charities, §§ 569-571), we cannot hold that
the naming of the hospital indicates a lack of charitable intention, or shows that, had he considered the matter, the testator
would have preferred no hospital to the less imposing structare that may be constructed with the funds avaD.a.ble.
[15] A further issue arising from the insufficiency of the
trust assets to carry out completely the express provisions of
the decree of distribution remains for decision. The Lorings
contend that the testator had no general charitable intention,
which is nonnally considered a requisite to the judicial application of the C'Y pres doctrine (see, cases collected, 74 A..L.R.
671; 39 Co1.L. Rev. 1358), that his intention was specific, and
that since it cannot be lit.erally carried out, the lack: of a gen~ra1 charitable intention precludes any modification of the
trust. This contention is based primarily on the provision in
the decree of distribution, following the language of the will,
that, if within two years after notification by the trustees that
the specified sums were available, the town fails to secure the
l'equired site for the hospital, "then this bequest shall absolutely lapse and the said sum of $75,000 provided for and not
applied according to this trust for said hospital and heating
plant, shall thereupon pass under the residuary clause of
decedent's will." Since the funds are not to be applied to a
different charitable purpose, if the town falls to secure a site
as required by the decree, it is reasonable to construe this'
provision as preeludinf! their application to a different charitable purpose, if for other reasons the particular purpose of
. <
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the testator cannot be carried out. It does not follow. however. that the particular purpose of the testator cannot be
carried out because there are less funds available than he had
contemplated. It is sumcient if that purpose can be substantially carried out.
[16] The C1J pres doctrine has meant many things to
many courts and its limits have rarely been defined. (See
2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, 1295 et seq.; 3 Scott on Trusts
2104.) The Restatement limits the doctrine to the rule that a
court of equity will carry out the general charitable intention
of the donor, when his specific purpose becomes impossible or
impractical of fulfillment, by directing the application of the
property to some charitable purpose that closely approximates his general charitable intention. (Rest. Trusts, § 399;
see Bogert, Op. cit. IUprG at 1287.) If the doctrine is confined within these limits, it follows that, if the charitable intention of the donor is specific and it becomes impossible or
impracticable to fulfill it, a provision in the trust for a gift
over in the event of the failure of the partieu1ar charitable
purpose prevents the application of the CfI prea doctrine.
[17] The specific charitable purpose does not become impossible or impractical of fulfillment, however, simply because
it cannot be carried out in the exact terms of the gift. Many
cases recognize that, independently of the C1l pres doctrine, a
court of equity has the power to modify the terms of a trust
in order substantially to carry out the intention of the testator. This rule applies both to private trusts (Adams v. Cook,
15 Ca1.2d 352, 361 [101 P.2d 484]; Rest. Trusts, § 167; 3
Scott on Trusts, § 167), and to charitable trusts. (Rest.
Trusts, § 381, and comment <a) thereunder.) Thus, where
the doctrine of C1J prea is confined within the limits defined
above, the equitable power of a court to modify the trust has
been applied to carry out the specific charitable intention of
the donor. (Allen v. NasIon lmtitute, 107 Me. 120, 124 [77
A. 638]; Manufacturer. Nat. Bank v. Woodward, 141 Me. 28
[38 A.2d 657, 658]; South Kingstown v. Wakefield Trust Co.,
48 R.I. 27, 32 [134 A. 815, 48 A.L.R. 1122].) A. substantially
similar doctrine is recognized in jurisdictions in which the cy
pres doctrine is said not to apply. (National Bank of Greece
v. Sa1Jarika, 167 Miss. 571, 593 [148 So. 649]; Noble v. First
National Bank, 236 Ala. 499 (183 So. 393, 396J; Dunn v.
Ellisor, 225 Ala. 15 [141 So. 700, 701].) Even in those jurisdictions in which the definition of the C1l pres doctrine appearR
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to be broader in scope, there is authority that this equitable
doctrine of modification or approximation is included within
the broader principle. (Crawfordsville TrUll Co. v. Elston
Bank ~ T. Co., 216 Ind. 596, 614 [25 N.E.2d 626] ; ParsOfl.B v.
Childs, IUpra, at 695; and see Village of Hinsdale v. Chicago
City Missionary Society, IUpra at 234.) Under any of these
views, there is no reason why a particular charitable purpose
may not be substantially earried out, even though there is a
provision for a gift over and the testator may not have had
an intention to aid charity in general.
The trust assets available for distribution will amount to
approximately $55,000 plus an undetermined refund of federal
estate taxes if the Town of Kingsley takes its pro rata share,
whereas the gifts under the trust total $111,000. If the trust
assets are pro rated among the beneficiaries and the town '1'1
share is divided in accordance with the decree of distribution,
between $15,000 and $18,000 will remain for the building of
a hospital instead of the $30,000 provided for this purpose in
the decree. Proportionally smaller sums will be available for
furnishings and for the maintenance fund; if a smaller hospital is built, however, less will be needed for these purposes.
The question as to the failure of the gift to the town may
thus be determined on the basis of the constructcion fund alone.
[18] The evidence presented at the trial shows that the
population of Kingsley, Iowa was 1,145 according to the 1940
census and that there had been no appreciable increase therein
at the time of the trial. There was testimony that, because of
the low construction costS and other advantages in the town,
a hospital adequate for its normal needs could be built for
about $15,000. The court found that there was no hospital in
Kingsley, Iowa, at the time of the death of the testator or at
any time since. Although there was no express finding of
fact as to whether this sum would be adequate, the trial court
ordered that a lesser amount, based on the one-third limitations applied to charitable gifts, be made available to the town
for this purpose. On fnll consideration of these facts, it must
be concluded that the building of a smaller structure would
substantially earry out the testator's intention. It is a reasonable modification of the trust to enforce the gift for a smaller
hospital rather than to allow the testator's intention to provide a hospital in the town to fail entirely. (See Estate of
Peabody, 154 Cal. 173, 178 [97 P. 184]; AUen v. Nasson Institute, "'pra, at p. 125; Jones' Unknown Heirs v. Dorchesfer
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.(Tex.Civ.App.) 224 S.W. 596, 604.) Moreover, such a modification is in accord with the policy of the law in favor of charitable gifts. (See Collierv. Lindley, supra; Village of HIMdale
v. Chico,go Oity MlssioMry Society, supra at p. 231; Zollman,
loco cit. supra, and cases there collected.) The gift of the Town
of Kingsley must, therefore, be sustained.
The order instructing trustees provides that the town shall
have one year from the date that the order determining the
amount distributable to the town shall have become final
within which to acquire a site for the hospital and heating
plant and "if it falls within said time to secure such site, then
the bequest to it shall absolutely lapse and shall thereupon
pass under the residuary clause of decedent's will." The decree of distnoution provides in part that when all the bequests
have been made the trust shall cease and all the rest, residue
and remainder of the trust estate shall thereupon be given
absolutely to Sarah M. Loring, the residuary beneficiary. The
Braille Institute has raised the question as to how the funds
are to be distributed in the event the town should fan to comply
with the terms of the order. Although there is some ambiguity, the proper construction of the decree of distribution is that there is no remainder or residue until all the money
gifts have been paid in full. (See eases collected in 118
A.L.R. 352.) In its memorandum opinion, the trial court so
construed the decree when it held that, if the share of the
town should become part of the residue, the BraUle Institute
should take its full gift. The same problem exists, however,
with respect to the other beneficiaries. That part of the order
instructing trustees is, therefore, modified by inserting the
following provision: In the event the Town of Kingsley fails
to take its share of the trust assets or fails to comply with this
order within the time specified, the pro rata share of the Town
of Kingsley shall be applied first to satisfy the money gifts to
the other beneficiaries in full; any sum remaining after these
gifts have been satisfied, shall be distributed to the residuary
beneficiary, Sarah M. Loring.
The order instructing trustees is further modified, in accordance with this opinion, to delete therefrom the paragraph limiting the gifts to the Town of Kingsley and to the
Brame Institute to one-third of the estate and providing that
". • • the bequests of specific sums to individuals should be
paid in full and the balance or residue distn'buted to Sarah M.
Loring." In its place, is substituted the following provision: i
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It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that upondistn"butIon,
the amount now available for distribution plus the amounts, if
any, of the overpayment of federal estate and California·inheritance taxes (less any future administrative expenses)
shall be distributed pro rata to the beneficiaries of the trust
in proportion to the specific IUInSprovided· in the decree of
distribution.

The order appealed from as modified herein 1s aftirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter. J., Schauer,
J .. and Spence, oJ. concurred..
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